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NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a workman's compensation case seeking 
review of an order issued by the Utah State Industrial 
Commission denying Plaintiff, Grover Odekirk, disability 
benefits from the "Special Fund" also known as the "Com-
bined Injury Fund," established by §35-1-69 Utah Code 
Annotated (1953). 
DISPOSITION AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Plaintiff, Grover Odekirk, filed a workman's 
compensation claim on June 30, 1976 (R. 25). Hearing 
was held December 7, 1976 (R. 48). On March 14, 1977, 
the matter was referred to a Medical Panel (R. 120). 
Thereafter, Administrative Law Judge, Joseph c. Foley, 
awarded Plaintiff certain permanent partial disability 
benefits from the Employer and Insurer as well as medical 
expenses, in particular all costs incurred for psychiatric 
therapy for one year's time, subject to further review 
(R. 243). Judge Foley further required the Plaintiff's 
psychiatrist, Dr. Reed Andrus, to submit written reports 
on Plaintiff's progress and treatment. 
On December 15, 1978, Judge Foley ordered the 
insurance carrier to pay for an additional six months of 
continued therapy (R. 269). 
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On May 23, 1979 Plaintiff moved for an order 
requiring the Insurer to pay for an additional 20 
psychiatric visits (R. 283). Judge Foley granted this 
motion on June 1, 1979 (R. 285). 
The Insurer made a timely motion to review that 
order as well as requesting modification of previous orders 
of November 17, 1977 and December 15, 1978 (R. 289). 
Plaintiff applied for benefits from the Special 
Fund (R. 299). On July 17, 1979, without further hearing 
the Industrial Commission affirmed the Administrative Law 
Judge and denied Plaintiff's application for benefits from 
the Special Fund (R. 303). 
On August 16, 1979, Plaintiff petitioned this 
Court for review of the denial of benefits from the Special 
Fund. The Employer and Insurer as well petitioned the Court 
for writ of review at the same time. Thereafter, the 
matter was consolidated upon the stipulation and motion of 
Plaintiff's counsels for the reason that both actions involved 
conunon questions of law and fact arising out of the same 
alleged industrial accident and injury and consolidation would 
avoid unnecessary costs and delay. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON REVIEW 
Plaintiff, Grover Odekirk, seeks an order setting 
aside Defendants' denial of benefits from the Special Fund 
and awarding the same. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The Plaintiff is a 51 year old man who has worked 
all his adult life as a truck driver, mainly in interstate 
traffic. 
On January 5, 1974 while employed by IML Freight, 
he lost control of the truck he was operating due to snow 
and slippery road conditions. The truck jackknifed, collided 
with the bank of the road and threw Plaintiff against the 
framework of the cab door, injurying his head and snapping 
or popping his neck (R. 55). 
After the accident, he was off work to February 
24, 1974. However, when he returned to work, his symptoms 
would become aggravated, and there would be periods of time 
off the job. Dr. Holbrook admitted him to St. Mark's 
Hospital on October 16, 1974 for rest, therapy, traction 
and muscle relaxers. In November, 1974 he was treated by 
Dr. Baer at Holy Cross Hospital by acupuncture. He was 
intermittently on and off work until May, 1974. During 
this time he began to experience severe depression and his 
family physician referred him to Dr. Reed Andrus. (The 
foregoing facts at R. 120.) He was off work from May 12, 
1975 until November, 1975 (R. 57, 58). He returned to the 
job until May, 1976 (R. 59). At that time he had a severe 
depression, attempted suicide (R. 59) and could not continue 
working due to the severe pain in his head. He stated, 
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"Well, everytime when I was out on that truck, I couldn't 
drive the thing but an hour and my head would start to 
explode. And, at the time that happened, right down 
in-between my shoulders here I would get a pain in my back 
right in the center that was just like a toothache. Every-
time my heart beat, my head would be like this." (R. 59). 
In March, 1977 he was seen by Dr. Erickson who reported 
Plaintiff continued to have headaches, tenseness and sore-
ness in shoulder and neck with increasing episodes of 
aching in the hands from the elbow level down with lack 
of strength and sensation of the hands (R. 126). 
His previous medical history in part includes 
an accident in January, 1960 when he was thrown out of a 
tanker (R 203). In 1970 due to stiff necks and headaches, 
Dr. Holbrook performed an anterior cervical disc excision 
and interbody fusion at CS-6 (R. 113). Mr. Odekirk testifiec 
that prior to the accident he had never experienced the 
depression, feelings of despair or suicidal inclinations 
from which he suffered (R. 62). He had been a heavy drinker 
and because of it decided to quit drinking all together 
in December, 1973. He did not drink since that time (R. 61). 
The Medical Panel reviewed a rather thorough 
medical file and reported after their own examination as 
follows: 
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1. Mr. Odekirk's total permanent physical 
impairment from all causes was 60 percent of the whole 
man. This was calculated by combining 4S percent loss 
of body function for psychiatric impairment with 2S 
percent loss of body function for pseudoarthrosis cervical 
spine with traumatic aggravation. 
2. Ten percent of the 4S percent psychiatric 
impairment was due from the industrial accident of January 
S, 1974. 
3. The degree of permanent impairment preexisting 
the industrial accident was SO percent loss of body function. 
This included 3S percent due to psychiatric problems com-
bined with 20 percent loss due to previous arthrodesis 
of CS-CG. 
4. Psychiatric treatment was absolutely necessary. 
(R. 209, 210) 
Since the time of the accident,he recieved 
psychotherapy from Dr. Andrus but it was often interrupted 
by the uncertainty over the insurance coverage due to the 
appeals by the insurance carrier. (Letter of Dr. Andrus. 
May 17, 1979, R. 282) He has not been gainfully employed 
since May 1976. 
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ARGUMENT 
I 
THE SPECIAL FUND PROVIDES DISABILITY 
BENEFITS TO THE PLAINTIFF. 
The Special Fund established in §35-1-69, 
Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended), provides dis-
ability benefits to workers with a preexisting incapacity 
who then sustain an industrial injury resulting in a 
permanent incapacity substantially greater than he would 
have incurred if he had not had the preexisting incapacity. 
The Medical Panel recognized that the Plaintiff 
was severely disabled, to the extent of 60 percent of the 
whole man (R. 209). His preexisting incapacity consisted 
of 20 percent loss of body function due to previous arthro-
desis of C5-C6 (cervical spine) with pseudoarthrosis 
(failure of fusion). (R. 209). 
The Panel psychiatrist felt that he had a psychia-
tric impairment of 45 percent loss of body function, 10 
percent of which was due to the accident (R. 210). 
His treating psychiatrist stated that the industria: 
accident combined with his own personality makeup, occupatio~ 
background, forced inactivity, dependancy, inability to 
lead a productive life, deep seated feelings of inadequacy, 
worthlessness, hopelessness, all of which were aggravated 
by physical symptoms and fears of other accidents led to 
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severe depression and total occupational disability in 
the only trade in which he had been gainfully employed. 
(R. 47) 
Plaintiff's preexisting impairments had not been 
disabilitating. He was employable as an interstate truck 
driver. He was no longer drinking alcohol. He did not 
require the services of a psychiatrist. He did not suffer 
from pain in his head or neck and had made a successful 
recovery from his operation in 1970 (R. 140). 
Essentially, his preexisting conditions and 
disabilities were dormant up to January 5, 1974. Had they 
not existed at all on that date, the industrial accident 
would have caused but a rather minor injury to his head. 
It certainly would not have led to occupational disability. 
The accident severely aggravated his preexisting 
conditions, all of which were complicated by an apparent 
disposure towards depression. As a result a 60 percent 
permanent partial disability was determined after the accident. 
This is substantially greater than he would have had, if 
there had been no preexisting disability. Sixty percent 
is substantially greater than 15 percent. 
In practical terms, the accident caused and created 
an occupational disability. The lack of fusion in his neck 
and the aggravation caused to it by the accident along with 
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the concomitant psychiatric problems, created a substantial 
work-related disability, requiring prolonged psychotherapy. 
Imagine the case of an employee with total 
blindness in one eye. If this person thereafter suffers 
an industrial injury totally blinding his other good eye, 
the resulting incapacity would be total blindness. Prior 
to the accident, this man had been employable, although 
handicapped. After the accident, he is totally disabled. 
Special Fund benefits are most appropriate in this case. 
The result is no different for Plaintiff Odekirk. 
This case is very similar to Intermountain 
Health Care, Inc. v. Ortega, 562 P~2d 617 (1977). In 
that case the Court held that medical expenses as well as 
compensation award should have been apportioned among the 
employer and the Special Fund. Id. at 619. The facts 
stated there, similar to the instant matter, recognize 
claimant had preexisting psychiatric impairment. The 
Court stated: 
"The position of the Defendant as 
reflected in the Commission's order 
seems to be predicated on the assumption 
that because the pre-existing condition 
was quiescent and did not require medi-
cal treatment until the accident, the 
plaintiff employer should be held respon-
sible for the entire expense thereof. 
But it will be noted that the statue 
makes no distinction between the award 
for compensation and medical expenses; 
and that if the requirement of the 
statute is met, that is, if the result-
ing permanent incapacity is substantially 
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greater than if the pre-existing 
incapacity had not existed, the 
proportional causation must be 
found and that portion attributable 
to the previous condition paid 
out of the Special Fund." Id. at 
619. 
The criteria for determining what is substantially 
greater was set forth in Ortega as follows: 
"It surely cannot be doubted that 
30 percent is substantially greater than 
20 percent, nor that 10 percent disability 
is itself substantial in that it is 
definite and measureable. Consequently, 
inasmuch as it appears that the pre-
existing condition increased the result-
ing disability by one-third, it follows 
that under the requirements of the statute, 
the medical expenses as well as the compen-
sation award should have been apportioned 
two-thirds from the employer and one-third 
from the Special Fund." Id. at 619. 
In the case at bar, the resulting disability 
of 60 percent is substantially greater than 15 percent. 
The resulting disability is definite and measureable. 
The work-related disability .i:s obvious. Th~inescapable 
\ 
conclusion is that benefits from the Speciaf Fund should 
be allowed. 
The uncontradicted medical evidence on file in 
this matter supports the conclusion that Plaintiff's result-
ing disability is substantially greater than what it would 
have been, but for no preexisting disability. The legal 
conclusions drawn by the Industrial Commission that this 
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evidence does not indicate a supstantially greater dis-
ability, is in error and not supported by the record. As 
a conclusion of law, it is reviewable and reversible by 
this Court. Wheritt v. Industrial Commission, u. 68, 
110 P.2d 374. 
Plaintiff Odekirk has lived with persistent 
pain in his head and neck since 1974 and has been coping 
with severe continuous disabling depression and occupational' 
disability. The award from the Employer, based on 15 
percent permanent partial disability, is wholly inadequate 
to compensate him for his disabilities. The Special Fund 
should be held liable for the amounts remaining based on a 
60 percent disability. 
II 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION FAILED TO 
EXERCISE ITS JURISDICTION PROPERLY 
AND DETERMINE PLAINTIFF'S RIGHTS TO 
BENEFITS FROM THE SPECIAL FUND. 
The Industrial Commission had exercised its 
jurisdiction to award and require Plaintiff's employer and 
the insurance company to pay for his psychiatric expenses. 
The Medical Panel indicated that psychotherapy was essential 
(R. 210). Unfortunately, due to the fact the insurance 
carrier contested its liability in this regard, much of the 
psychotherapy was interrupted because of prohibited cost. 
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This even led to a moderate relapse (R. 282, 301). 
Therefore, psychotherapy has not been of the value that 
may have been contemplated, and the Plaintiff has continued 
to suffer. Although the insurance carrier certainly is 
entitled to appellate procedures, the necessary delay caused 
by the same has led to great hardship in the case of the 
Plaintiff. 
Plaintiff's application for Special Fund benefits 
is justified in time now due to the reasons previously 
set forth. Certainly his entitlement to benefits is as 
justified, if not more so, than the insurance carriers. 
However, his application for compensation from the Special 
Fund was denied w±thout so much as the benefit of a re•hearing. 
In the case Buxton v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 
587 P.2d 121, this court reversed the Industrial Commission's 
refusals to make findings and an award regarding Claimant's 
application for permanent total disability benefits to be 
paid out of the Special Fund. The Court held: 
"The Commission's jurisdiction to 
act on an application for modification 
of a previous order derives from §78 of 
the Act. That section empowers the 
Commission to make such rnodif ication of 
former findings and orders as 'in its 
opinion may be justified.' The section 
has been previously construed to require, 
as the basis of modification, evidence 
of some significant change or new devel 
ment in the claimant's injury or proof. 
of the previous award's inadequacy. 
(Citing Kennecott Copper Corp. v. 
Industrial Commission 19 U.2d, 158, 
P.2d 952). On the evidence presente Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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at the 197S hearing, the Commission 
found that the evidence of change or 
new development in the injury or 
inadequacy of the previous award 
was insufficient to justify the 
modification of its 1971 findings 
from SS percent loss of bodily fur.c-
tion to total disability, the only 
modification which would assist 
Plaintiff in any way. 
Even though the Commission is 
obliged to modify previous orders 
only when 'in its opinion,' modifi-
cation is justified, the Commission 
is not vested with arbitrary power; 
and it cannot simply ignore competent 
and credible evidence when there is 
nothing discrediting therein and there 
is no evidence to the contrary .•• 
it is the Commission's duty to deter-
mine whether that loss of function 
represents total disability in terms 
of capacity to perform remunerative 
employment, and the determination 
must be made on competent evidence." 
S87 P.2d at 123 (1978). 
In the instant case the Industrial Commission 
totally ignored the application, the evidence before it, and 
the various issue~ put before it by counsel for both Plain-
tiff and the insurance carrier, flatly denying the petitions, 
without so much as a word as to indicate its reasoning justi· 
fying the denial as required by statute. This is arbitrary 
and capricious. The Commission should be reversed. 
Plaintiff Odekirk has suffered a great ordeal since 
even the time of the original hearing in 1976. Subsequent 
to that time, the Ortega case was issued. As well, the 
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Administrative Law Judge issued several orders in regards 
to psychiatric treatment but the effect of those orders 
was nullified by economic realities in the face of appeals 
by the insurance carrier. 
This matter should be remanded back to the 
Industrial Commission and an award made based on Plaintiff's 
application for benefits from the Special Fund. 
CONCLUS'ION 
Plaintiff's application for benefits from the 
Special Fund was arbitrarily and capriciously denied. 
Plaintiff suffers from a disability that resulted from 
his industrial injury of January 5, 1974 and was sub-
stantially greater than it would have been had he had 
no preexisting disabilities. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully prays for 
an award of compensation from the "Special Fund" after 
the Employer's liability has been first deducted. 
Dated this 
1979. 
day of 
ARTHUR F. SANDACK 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
370 East 500 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 531-0555 
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